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Abstract
The final years of the 2010s marked an upturn in coverage on climate change. In Sweden, 
legacy media wrote more on the issue than ever before, especially in connection to the 
drought and wildfires in the summer of 2018 and the Fridays for Future movement started 
by Greta Thunberg. Reporting on climate change also reached unprecedented levels in the 
growingly influential far-right media ecosystem; from being a topic discussed hardly at all, 
it became a prominent issue. In this study, we use a toolkit from critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) to research how three Swedish far-right digital media sites reported on climate dur-
ing the years 2018–2019. We show how the use of conspiracy theories, anti-establishment 
rhetoric, and nationalistic arguments created an antagonistic reaction to increased demands 
for action on climate change. By putting climate in ironic quotation marks, a discourse was 
created where it was taken for granted that climate change was a hoax.
Keywords: far right, climate change denial, scare-quotes, Greta Thunberg, digital media
Introduction
The climate crisis is recognised as the defining issue of our time. Overwhelming 
scientific evidence has shown for three decades that rising temperatures will affect 
the living conditions for all life on earth (Stoddard et al., In press). However, it 
took until 2018 before it was extensively discussed in the growingly influential far-
right media ecosystem in Sweden. As a response to increasing coverage in legacy 
media – both in Sweden and abroad (Nacu-Schmidt et al., 2020; Vi-skogen & 
Retriever, 2019, 2020) – climate change became an important issue also for the far 
right. But, as we show in this study, instead of taking it seriously, a discourse was 
created where climate change was put into ironic quotation marks, and anyone 
demanding action was ridiculed.
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In this article, we examine the climate change discourse on three far-right 
media sites during the years 2018–2019. The sites are Fria Tider, Samhällsnytt, 
and Nya Tider, which all reach between 6 and 11 per cent of Sweden’s population 
(Newman et al., 2020). First, we provide a background on the climate change 
contrarian movement in the US and discuss how denialism has spread to the Eu-
ropean far right. We then describe the Swedish media system, comparing it with 
Benkler and colleagues’ (2018) idea of how the far-right media ecosystem can be 
understood in terms of the propaganda feedback loop, before we account for the 
studied media sites. We situate our qualitative reading in the critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) tradition of Norman Fairclough (2010) and use Stanley Cohen’s 
(2001) schema of denial to analyse the discourse. After presenting our empirical 
findings, we end with a discussion and point towards further research.
Climate change denial and a changing Swedish media system
The strategy of denouncing climate change as a hoax has roots back to the late-
1980s as a tactic by extractive companies such as Exxon Mobil (Boykoff, 2011; 
Oreskes & Conway, 2011). In the US – and to some extent in Canada and Aus-
tralia – the collaboration between fossil fuel interests and conservative think 
tanks in questioning climate science has been revealed in an array of studies (e.g., 
Brulle, 2014; Farrell, 2016; Jacques & Knox, 2016; McCright & Dunlap, 2003; 
Young & Coutinho, 2013). They show how what Riley Dunlap and Aaron Mc-
Cright (2011) named the “climate change denial machine” was highly funded, 
and how it manufactured and pushed contrarian arguments into what Benkler 
and colleagues (2018) recently named the right-wing media ecosystem. The cur-
rent sharp ideological divide between Republicans and Democrats in the US on 
climate science has not always existed. It is partly a function of strategic lobbyism 
by fossil fuel interests and conservative think tanks, which has taken advantage 
of, and fuelled, a growing rift during the last 30 years. In Europe, recent research 
shows that contrarian think tanks have been active in spreading denial since the 
mid-1990s, and that they have increased their output in recent years (Almiron et 
al., 2020; Ekberg & Pressfeldt, 2021). In the UK, which has a polarised media 
system, climate change denial has been prominent in opinion pieces in the right-
wing media (Painter & Ashe, 2012).
Since 2000, concern over climate change has generally increased in Sweden 
(Rönnerstrand, 2019). There was a consensus in legacy media around the science 
of climate change until 2006, when a marked upturn in reporting accompanied 
the creation of a more organised climate change denial movement in the form of 
the Climate Realists (formerly the Stockholm Initiative) (Anshelm & Hultman, 
2014). This influenced the far-right party, the Sweden Democrats (SD), who 
started spreading doubt about climate science in the parliament in 2013 (Hultman 
et al., 2019). Since entering the parliament in 2010, SD has enjoyed increased 
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electoral support in every election, winning votes from both the Social Democrats 
and the Moderates (liberal-conservative), as well as engaging an electorate that 
previously did not vote. In the last election, in 2018, the party received 17.5 per 
cent of the vote (Aylott & Bolin, 2019). The Sweden Democrats’ main focus is 
immigration, and they position themselves as the only opposition party, claiming 
the other seven parties “are all the same” (Rydgren & van der Meiden, 2019). 
The legacy, or traditional, news media in Sweden is characterised by two 
large public service broadcasters in television and radio and four national and 
several local newspapers. The media is self-regulated through the Code of Ethics 
for Press, Radio and Television in Sweden, and a system of public press subsidies 
is designed to secure a pluralistic media system. While the legacy media outlets 
position themselves both to the left and right politically in their opinion pieces, 
they all adhere to what Benkler and colleagues (2018: 77) characterise as profes-
sional truth-seeking norms in a “reality-check dynamic”: 
Outlets compete on the truth and freshness of their news, and the search 
for scoops and sensationalism is in tension with the internal norms and the 
fact that other outlets will try to build their own credibility and audience 
in part by policing them if they get it wrong. 
The reality-check dynamic might be one of the reasons why the consensus around 
climate science continued in Swedish legacy media even after the formation of the 
Climate Realists and the rise of SD. But even if climate change was not denied, it 
was arguably under-reported. After the climate summit in 2009, interest dropped, 
and it was only in 2018 and 2019 that it again reached the same levels, when the 
heatwave, drought, and unprecedented wildfires in the summer of 2018 – together 
with Greta Thunberg’s school strike movement the following autumn – marked 
an increase in reporting on climate (Vi-skogen & Retreiver, 2019, 2020).
During the last decade, far-right anti-immigration alternative media has 
become an increasingly influential phenomena in Sweden and abroad (Haller et 
al., 2019; Nygaard, 2019; Ylä-Anttila et al., 2019).1 Sweden has been singled 
out in both national and international far-right media as the case that alleged-
ly proves that a progressive welfare state is not compatible with open borders 
(Mulhall, 2020; Titley, 2019). Leading up to the national election in Sweden in 
2018, far-right alternative media increased in visibility on social media platforms, 
with Samhällsnytt being especially successful in engaging readership through 
Facebook (Larsson, 2019; Sandberg & Ihlebæck, 2019). Parallel to the way SD 
position themselves as the opposition, these sites claim that legacy media, and 
especially the public broadcasters, echoes the voice of the political elites, rather 
than being a watchdog (Holt, 2019). SD supporters are also the least trustful of 
the public service broadcasters and legacy media (Andersson, 2020). The media 
sites in our study reach between 6–11 per cent of the Swedish online population 
(Newman et al., 2020), and until recently, none of them had signed on to the 
self-regulatory Code of Ethics for media.2 The sites are part of a far-right media 
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ecosystem that can be characterised by what Benkler and colleagues (2018) call 
the identity-confirming propaganda feedback loop. Actors in this loop police each 
other not by truthfulness, but by ideology. Anyone perceived to be stepping out 
of line is exposed.
An empirically noted, but so far under-studied, subject is how opposition to 
climate change has become a core feature of the European far right (Forchtner 
& Kølvraa, 2015; Forchtner et al., 2018; Jeffries, 2017; Lockwood, 2018). Most 
studies focusing on these themes analyse the rhetoric of politicians or political 
parties (e.g., Forchtner, 2019; Schaller & Carius, 2019) and show how far-
right anti-immigration parties such as Alternative for Deutschland, SD, and 
the Austrian FPÖ, to different degrees, have opposed climate change mitigation 
policies and spread doubt about the science. Some studies show how far-right 
media can send mixed messages, opposing climate change action while still being 
supportive of local environmental issues such as the German forest (Forchtner & 
Özvatan, 2019). Others have, via surveys, shown a strong correlation between 
climate change denialism and nationalism (Kulin et al., 2021); conspiracy theories 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2015); distrust in public service media (Jylhä et al., 2020); 
and opposition to feminism and immigration (Jylhä & Hellmer, 2020; Krange et 
al., 2018). The latter is also seen in a study of online groups in Germany (Kaiser 
& Puschmann, 2017).
Little research has been done regarding climate change on far-right media, 
and no peer-reviewed studies focus on how the Swedish far-right media ecosystem 
report on climate change. In a corpus collected for a study on far-right media 
in 2016 – which included all the sites in this study3 – neither environment nor 
climate change were covered at all (Holt, 2016). The issue of climate change is 
thus new in the reporting of the far-right media ecosystem. The yearly Reuters 
Institute Digital News Report shows an increasing reach for these sites, and the 
latest report also shows that the Swedish population is nearly as polarised as the 
US regarding opinions on climate change (Newman et al., 2020). Increasingly 
diverging opinions have also been noted in studies by the SOM-institute at the 
University of Gothenburg (Rönnerstrand, 2019). These two phenomena, a grow-
ingly influential far-right media system, and signs of an increasing divide regarding 
the need for action on climate change is disconcerting in a country that sees itself 
– and is often seen globally – as an environmental leader. 
Corpus and method
In order to explore how the Swedish far-right media ecosystem reported on climate 
change during 2018–2019, we focused on three media sites.4 
 Fria Tider [Free Times] has the second-biggest reach of the Swedish online far-
right alternative media sites. It reaches 11 per cent of the online population, 
and 27 per cent say they trust it as a news source (Newman et al., 2020). The 
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Swedish Media Council has described the site as publishing “obviously racist, 
xenophobic and Islamophobic” material (Statens medieråd, 2013: 60). In our 
corpus, Fria Tider is the site with the most articles about climate change (n = 
292), and it is a topic that has become increasingly prominent during the two 
years (see Figure 1).
 Samhällsnytt [Community/Society News] is the third-biggest of the far-right 
alternative media, reaching 9 per cent of the Swedish online population. The 
site claims to be independent of SD, but it is run by an organisation started by 
the party and has editorials written by SD politicians. In its coverage, clear rac-
ist stereotypes are often used. In our corpus, it has the second-highest number 
of articles (n = 251), and as with Fria Tider, the issue became more prominent 
over time (see Figure 1).
 Nya Tider [New Times] has both an online and a print edition. It comes out 
twice weekly and reaches 6 per cent of the Swedish online population (Newman 
et al. 2020). According to official subscription figures, it has 6,700 subscrib-
ers. Nya Tider started in 2012 and has, as a printed newspaper, been eligible 
for public press subsidies. It now receives roughly EUR 490,000 annually 
(Mediestödsnämnden, 2020). In our corpus, it stands out as the only site that 
reported on climate change already in early 2018, but reporting did not increase 
during the studied period (see Figure 1). It is the site with the least number of 
articles (n = 47).
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The corpus was collected through a search in the Nordic digital press archive 
Retriever, conducted in March 2020. By using the search string “klimat* OR 
uppvärmning OR *greta*” [“climate* OR warming OR *greta*”], we received a 
total of 750 articles from the three sites. The reason to include “*greta*” was to 
not miss any reporting about climate activist Greta Thunberg. One could argue 
that this makes any article count meaningless, as there would be no articles writ-
ten about Thunberg before she started her strike. Conducting the search without 
“*greta*”, however, still resulted in 733 articles, meaning the term had limited 
effect on the number of articles, but the few included might provide insight into 
how the far-right media ecosystem reacted to the activist’s rise to fame. After 
removing 152 articles not related to climate change (mainly about the “political 
climate” or “the climate of debate”), two duplicates, three articles that had been 
removed from the sites, and three articles on Nya Tider where a large part of the 
text was behind a paywall, the corpus was reduced to 590 articles. Nya Tider 
operates a soft paywall, and if articles behind the wall were available in print, we 
accessed these through the archives at the Royal Library.
We see discourse as “being socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned” 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 258), and as such, discourses of climate change are 
shaped by – and help shape – societal responses to greenhouse gas emissions and 
rising temperatures. Discourses are also elements of social processes. Building on 
the work of Norman Fairclough, we see the “order of discourse” as the semiotic 
aspect of a relatively stable and established social practice situated in wider social 
structures. The order of discourse consists of genres (“ways of acting”), styles 
(“ways of being”), and discourses (“ways of representing”) (Fairclough, 2010: 
74–75). The far-right media ecosystem can be seen as a social practice, and its 
order of discourse is thus made up of genres (e.g., news reporting, columns), styles 
(e.g., authoritarian, claiming to be corrective of legacy media) and discourses (e.g., 
nativist, anti-immigration/racist, anti-establishment). As we see in the article count, 
the discourse of climate change has recently been added, and in the remainder of 
the article, we are mainly concerned with how this is done. As we are locating 
our research at “the order of discourse-level”, we do a qualitative reading of a 
relatively large corpus, rather than a line-by-line analysis of a few selected texts.
To connect the discourse of climate change in the far-right media ecosystem 
with previous work on climate change denial, we follow Stanley Cohen’s (2001) 
classification scheme (for previous use in climate research, see, e.g., Björnberg et 
al., 2017; Norgaard, 2011). Cohen suggests there are three different answers to 
the question of what is denied. The first is literal denial – to say that something 
is not happening; in the climate context, these are arguments about the earth not 
heating up or that it is not caused by humans. The second is interpretive denial – 
reinterpreting the meaning of what is happening in a way that it loses significance; 
for example, to claim that global warming is positive. The third is implicatory 
denial; this is not about denying the knowledge, but rather its moral, political, 
and psychological implications and how individuals, institutions, or states do 
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not act despite knowing they should. Cohen (2001: 103) stresses that different 
types of denial often appear simultaneously, as their relationship is “ideological, 
rather than logical”.
Combining a toolkit from CDA with Cohen’s scheme, we have closely exam-
ined all articles in our corpus twice, asking two questions:
1. What types of perceived climate change knowledge are used?
This relates to the sources of information. We examine if the far-right media 
ecosystem is informed by the established science or by the climate change coun-
termovement, and what tropes of denial might be used.
2. What strategies are used to spread information and disinformation?
Disinformation spreads easily in a system characterised by the propaganda feed-
back loop. Here we look at semiotic aspects, such as meaning-making metaphors 
and keywords, and at different political strategies.
Scare-quoting climate: Denial as background knowledge
The climate change discourse on the right-wing media ecosystem is dominated 
by literal and interpretative denial. Nya Tider is the site that most explicitly en-
gages with, and denies, climate science, and it did so even before the topic rose to 
prominence on the other two sites. This can be highlighted by two articles, leading 
up to and following an international climate change contrarian conference held 
outside Gothenburg in February 2018, organised by the Swedish climate denial 
network Klimatsans [Climate Sense/Reason] (Björklund, 2018a, 2018b). The 
lead-up article states the following: 
Climate threat-sceptics have identified a series of basic problems with climate 
science as it is presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). Among these are deviations from the scientific method, the accuracy 
of climate models, modelling of the carbon cycle and questionable data 
adjustments, which will be discussed at the conference. (Björklund, 2018a)5
Another example of how Nya Tider is part of the literal denial movement is 
when a prominent member of the movement starts contributing for the site, 
writing, among other articles, a favourable review of a book by the contrar-
ian American blogger Marc Morano at Climate Depot (Tornvall, 2018). The 
Morano review is an example of literal and interpretive denial arguments be-
ing used in the same text, claiming “it is not more carbon dioxide heating the 
atmosphere, it is warmer oceans gassing out more carbon dioxide – with a 
positive effect on vegetation and yields”. Here climate change is seen as not 
anthropocentric (literal denial) and increasing amounts of carbon dioxide will 
be positive (interpretative denial).
While Nya Tider engages with contrarian climate science, the idea of cli-
mate change as a hoax becomes taken-for-granted, background knowledge on 
86
Kjell Vowles & Martin Hultman
Samhällsnytt and Fria Tider (for previous research on background knowledge 
in CDA, see Fairclough, 2010: 31–36). These sites seldom discuss the actual 
science of climate change, and when they do, it is often with a link to the con-
trarian YouTube channel SwebbTV. This can be exemplified in an article on Fria 
Tider about the meeting between Thunberg and UN Secretary-General Antonio 
Guterres (Fria Tider, 2018c). In the article, there is a short recap and a link to a 
SwebbTV interview with the well-known climate contrarian Lars Bern (Ekberg 
& Pressfeldt, 2021), who claims climate change is a hoax pushed by globalists 
aiming to create supra-national governance. With this reference, the meeting 
between Thunberg and Guterres is ridiculed. When climate science is discussed 
more in-depth, mainly in opinion pieces, common denialist tropes of religion, 
globalism, and a threat to free speech are used (e.g., R. Malm, 2018; Dagerlind, 
2019; Tullberg, 2019; for previous research on these tropes, see, e.g., Anshelm 
& Hultman, 2014).
The literal denial on SwebbTV helps create the background knowledge that 
Fria Tider and Samhällsnytt lean on. In the discourse on these sites, the IPCC 
is considered an unscientific, politically correct organisation producing alarmist 
reports, while SwebbTV is seen to produce in-depth interviews with prominent 
climate scientists exposing the truth about climate hysteria (e.g., Fria Tider, 2018d; 
R. Malm, 2019). A similar role is served by a non-peer-reviewed manuscript about 
climate change by two Finnish scientists (Kauppinen & Malmi, 2019), which was 
uploaded to arXiv, an open archive for scholarly articles. The manuscript claimed 
there was no anthropogenic cause for global warming and was widely circulated 
on denialist blogs, despite the fact that its findings had been thoroughly dismissed 
(see, e.g., Climate Feedback, 2019). Fria Tider reference it several times in short 
sentences (e.g., Fria Tider, 2019c) to provide fodder for the background knowledge 
of climate change as a hoax.
The argument about climate change as a hoax is a clear contrast to legacy 
media where climate science is taken as real. The reinterpretation of climate 
change as hoax is marked in Fria Tider’s and Samhällsnytt’s reporting by the use 
of quotation marks and terms such as “so-called” or “alleged” (e.g., Nilsson, 
2018; Samhällsnytt, 2018). In this way, “climate” and associated terms such as 
“climate activism” and “greenhouse gas emission” become semiotically important 
keywords, as discussed in previous scholarship (Boréus & Seiler Brylla, 2018). We 
first find this practice in July 2018, when several wildfires were raging in Sweden, 
in a response to an opinion piece in the Swedish national tabloid Expressen, which 
connects the fires with climate change and the carbon-intensive lifestyles of white 
men. Ridiculing the connection, Fria Tider wrote that Expressen claimed “it is 
elderly white men who deny so-called climate change” (Fria Tider, 2018a). After 
this, the use of quotation marks and the term so-called to denote climate change 
became modus operandi for Fria Tider and important for Samhällsnytt. Fria Tider 
used these 146 times in 116 articles (e.g., Fria Tider, 2018b, 2019b, 2019d). 
To create antagonisms towards climate change policy, it is often juxtaposed to 
87
 Scare-quoting climate
welfare and security, which are perceived to be serious and worthy of attention 
(e.g., Fria Tider, 2019e). 
This denotation of climate change becomes a core discoursal feature on the 
right-wing media ecosystem. In dialectical relation to the mainstream media dis-
course, where climate is seen as a serious issue, the keywords here are distanced 
to provoke ridicule and irony. The quotation marks are used in two related 
but slightly different ways. The first is to pick out specific words from a longer 
quotation. An example is when Samhällsnytt comments on a news item on SVT, 
saying that “the state-television uses the word ‘climate’ as many as eight times 
in its article” (Kristoffersson, 2019c). Here, the quotation marks around climate 
references what was said on SVT and is thus a factually correct statement, but 
by singling out one word from its wider context, it is given an ironic meaning. 
Formally, this technique is similar to irony in legacy media, which can signal 
critical distance while staying truthful to the objective, official facts (Glasser & 
Ettema, 1993).
The second way to use quotation marks is the so-called scare quotes. Scare 
quotes do not refer to someone else’s words, but signal that the word has a dif-
ferent meaning than its literal interpretation. This is a way of quoting that the 
German philologist Victor Klemperer acknowledged in the language of the Third 
Reich, commenting that the “excessive use of what I would call ironic quotation 
marks […] does not restrict itself to quoting, but questions instead the truth of 
what is quoted and declares the quoted content a lie” (Klemperer, 1947, cited in 
Vandergriff, 2012). The use of scare quotes has been noted in recent scholarship 
on the present far-right in regard to refugees (Kreis, 2017), and in passing in con-
nection to the climate (Forchtner et al., 2018). It was also used by the Sweden 
Democrats who put climate in scare quotes in their 2016 budget (Hultman et 
al., 2019). In our corpus, scare-quoting is used extensively, one example is when 
Fria Tider refers to the former Swedish Minister of Environment and Climate 
Isabella Lövin as “‘Minister of climate’ Isabella Lövin” (Fria Tider, 2019a). By 
scare-quoting her official title, Fria Tider implies that Isabella Lövin is a fraudulent 
politician. It is an echo of the way scare quotes were used by the far right nearly 
a century ago, when Klemperer noticed how “Chamberlain and Churchill and 
Roosevelt are always only ‘statesmen’ in ironic inverted commas, Einstein is a 
‘research scientist’, Rathenau a ‘German’ and Heine a ‘German writer’” (Klem-
perer, 2000, cited in Vandergriff, 2012).
Oppositional strategies:  
Averting blame and attacking political elites
One way of opposing action on climate is to avert the blame. The claim that the 
actions of a small country like Sweden are negligible in a global context is a form 
of implicatory denial that is repeatedly used, for example, in an opinion piece 
claiming that “even if we closed Sweden completely our reduced carbon dioxide 
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emissions would be eaten up in a few weeks by China’s rising emissions. Sweden is 
responsible for 1 permille of the global emissions of greenhouse gases” (R. Malm, 
2019). This is a framing of the problem implying that nothing can be done nation-
ally. As part of the Global North, Sweden has a large historic carbon footprint, 
and is obliged by the Paris Agreement to cut its emissions faster (Anderson et 
al., 2020), so by pointing the finger of blame elsewhere, the moral and political 
implications are being denied.
Another strategy is to attack anyone promoting action on climate change, 
which is done mainly in two different ways. The first is by portraying politicians 
and other climate change leaders as a greedy, hypocritical elite. An example 
is when Fria Tider (2019f) reported on a study which shows that celebrities 
are the most frequent flyers (Gössling, 2019). While still scare-quoting climate 
change, Fria Tider quoted the scientist in a sincere manner to legitimate its own 
anti-establishment rhetoric. The portrayed elite is often depicted with unflatter-
ing images. One article about how the former president of the European Com-
mission Jean-Claude Juncker uses a private jet, is noteworthy for the picture 
collage (Kristoffersson, 2019a). Two images are pasted together, one showing a 
luxury airplane seat with a bottle of champagne, the other an extreme close-up of 
Juncker laughing with an open mouth, with the nose being a central part of the 
image. Another article uses a similar collage, where a picture of new Volvo cars 
is pasted next to an extreme close-up of Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven 
(Kristoffersson, 2019b). The prime minister is laughing with an open mouth with 
no interaction between Stefan Löfven and the camera. It is worth noting that the 
exact same image of Stefan Löfven has appeared several times on Klimatupplys-
ningen, a denialist blog run by the Climate Realists (e.g., Welander, 2018). These 
repetitive images resemble caricatures, similar to the antisemitic images common 
in pre-second world war Europe.
The second type of attack is the spreading of conspiracy theories. This is most 
clearly articulated in Nya Tider, which picked up and articulated a conspiracy 
theory linking Greta Thunberg to George Soros. In April 2019, Nya Tider posted 
an article in English titled “George Soros behind Greta Thunberg” (Persson, 
2019), which was illustrated with a manipulated photo where Soros’s face was 
pasted over Greta Thunberg’s. The article was shared more than 36,000 times 
in social media, according to Nya Tider’s own statistics, and in our corpus, we 
see the conspiracy theory spread to both Samhällsnytt and Fria Tider (Fria Tider, 
2019g; Westlund, 2019). In connection with Greta Thunberg’s speech at the UN 
Climate Action Summit in New York in September 2019, it also gained interna-
tional traction and was circling in the propaganda feedback loop of the interna-
tional far-right media ecosystem (Dave et al., 2020). This time, it was illustrated 
with another fake image, where Soros’s face had been pasted over Al Gore’s, in a 




The climate change discourse on the Swedish far-right media ecosystem in the 
years 2018–2019 can be summed up as being antagonistic towards action on 
climate change. As we have seen, climate change became a prominent issue for 
Samhällsnytt and Fria Tider during these years, especially after the climate change 
justice movement gained increasing visibility with Greta Thunberg’s school strike. 
In early 2018, it was a topic seldom reported, and it could be argued that the 
far-right media ecosystem was agnostic about climate change: it was a topic that 
didn’t deserve their attention. But when it became increasingly visible in legacy 
media, it could no longer be ignored. The agnostic attitude turned antagonistic: by 
using scare quotes and creating a discourse where climate change was perceived 
of as a hoax, as well as spreading conspiracy theories, using anti-establishment 
rhetoric and imagery and pointing the finger of blame elsewhere, the right-wing 
media ecosystem went on the attack.
Turning to our research questions, we can see the following:
1. It is mainly Nya Tider who discusses the science of climate change and engages 
with the international contrarian movement by covering conferences and re-
viewing books. On Fria Tider and Samhällsnytt, the idea of climate change as a 
hoax becomes taken-for-granted background knowledge that only occasionally 
needs to be justified through references to contrarian material.
2. The far-media ecosystem uses the strategies of scare-quoting climate, recircling 
conspiracy theories, and using anti-establishment rhetoric to oppose any action 
on climate change. These strategies are based on the literal denial of climate 
change, but implicatory denial is used to avert blame. The propaganda feedback 
helps to propel and amplify these strategies.
One point of note is that very few articles – and only from Nya Tider – take an 
eco-fascist stance. It has been suggested that positions on climate change might be 
changing within the European far right. As the consequences of rising tempera-
tures are felt, the argument is that denialism will be untenable, and far-right actors 
will move to green nationalism or even eco-fascism (Dyett & Thomas, 2019). Our 
study shows this is not inevitable. When climate change is discussed more broadly 
in society, it can instead fuel an angry backlash among actors opposing action.
On the basis of our results, we suggest that further studies are needed of You-
Tube material (SwebbTV in the case of Sweden), since many sites refer to such 
material, as well as the ideological underpinnings to the hostility against Greta 
Thunberg and other activists, researchers, and politicians taking action based on 
climate science. A third suggestion is to study the international dimensions of 
the far-right media ecosystem; for example, Russia has substantial and recipro-
cal relations with the European far right, not least regarding media initiatives 
(Shekhovtsov, 2018).
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Sweden is often touted, both nationally and internationally, as a climate-pro-
gressive country, but the Swedish climate law does not, for example, comply with 
the Paris Agreement (Anderson et al., 2020). On a societal level, this constitutes 
a form of implicatory denial, to accept the facts but not act accordingly, but we 
know little about how this might interact with the discourses of the far right to 
create inertia. A final suggestion for further research is then to investigate how 
the climate denial discourse in the far-right media ecosystem connects to climate 
discourse in legacy media.
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Notes
 1. The term “alternative media” has traditionally been used for media initiatives on the left side of 
the political spectrum. Holt and colleagues (2019) argue that an umbrella definition of alter-
native media is needed to connect present research with the previous body of literature. The 
essence is that alternative media perceive itself in opposition to a hegemonic media discourse 
“corrupted by, dependent on and uncritical of the establishment” (Holt et al., 2019: 861). 
Nygaard (2019) and Holt (2018) distinguish “immigration-critical alternative media” but this 
term does not capture the ideological questions that affect their reporting on climate change. 
A similar term is “counter-media” (Ylä-Anttila et al., 2019), which highlights the oppositional 
character but misses the ideological dimension. Instead, we use the term far-right alternative 
media, but we acknowledge that the this is a broad characterisation that includes ideological 
variance.
 2. Changes in the public press subsidy system in 2020, making digital media eligible for subsidies if 
they follow professional norms, led to Samhällsnytt and Nya tider signing up to the ethical code. 
It remains to be seen how this might affect their reporting.
 3. Samhällsnytt was included in the shape of its predecessor Avpixlat.
 4. Nyheter Idag is the alternative media site with the largest reach. Having been part of the ethical 
code since 2014, however, it can be argued that it has an in-between position between the far-
right media ecosystem and the legacy media. Therefore, it has been left out of the present study.
 5. All quotes from the empirical material are translated by Kjell Vowles.
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